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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from the December 9, 1993, denial of 
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider, which upheld the April 20, 
1993, order granting summary judgment dismissal to O. Brenton 
Rowe, Glenwood Humphries, Jon Neighbor, Cory Pulsipher, and Byron 
T. Knighton in this case. 
This case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(k)(1994 supp). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by granting 
the Washington County Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion and 
ordering summary judgment in Defendants' favor? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b), 
the appellate court must accept "the material allegations of 
the complaint as true, and [consider] them and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff." St Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedicts Hosp. . 811 P. 2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). The 
propriety of granting dismissal is a question of law. The 
appellate court gives the trial court's ruling no deference 
and reviews it under a correctness standard. Id. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated §63-30-4(4) 
An Employee may be joined in an action against a 
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or 
omission complained of is one for which the governmental 
entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally 
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, unless it is established that the 
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-11-10• Actions against officers - Costs 
and attorneys7 fees. 
Before any action may be filed against any sheriff, 
constable, peace officer, state road officer, or any other 
person charged with the duty of enforcement of the criminal 
laws of this state, or service of civil process, when such 
action arises out of, or in the course of the performance of 
his duty, or in any action upon the bond of any such officer, 
the proposed plaintiff, as a condition precedent thereto, 
shall prepare and file with, and at the time of filing the 
complaint in any such action, a written undertaking with at 
least two sufficient sureties in an amount to be fixed by the 
court, conditioned upon the diligent prosecution of such 
action, and, in the event judgment in the said cause shall be 
against the plaintiff, for the payment to the defendant of all 
costs and expenses that may be awarded against such plaintiff, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the 
court. In any such action, the prevailing party therein 
shall, in addition to an award of costs as otherwise provided, 
recover from the losing party therein such sum as counsel fees 
as shall be allowed by the court. The official bond of any 
such officer shall be liable for any such costs and attorney 
fees. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
! 1111H iff complaint raised f \ve Causes c: Action against 
Brenton Rowe, Gler.^jj,. Pulsipher, and 
Byroi Knighton, a,* Washington a,u.,t: LHI^J^:-— 
~*--
jr<=" ^ !*>* Washington County DefendantsM 
. - w - ... • - * Enterprises Act, Utah 
Code A m , <*76-;o-i6U2 et s-e^  :: * .u Washington , . •„ * 
officers and employees : m e State f uta:. Record pp. 
• * - ~ , * -o Imprisonment both 
:.,
 : .- irizona against • „ ^  defendants name- i I h '"»»1111»I u i i 1 " 
(Recor' * Three alleged Aggravated Kidnapping and/or 
Kidnappir defendants. (Record pp. 29-30) 
Count, Fou: alleged Fraud, diid spec 11 J Vd \ i y ,i J 1 cyi : 
r)laintiff was arrested under a fraudulent Utah Governor's 
Wan ; ("Reou" •' i • ''• ,!• 
• 2 k Memorandum was written by Defenc" K m Is* it I I'pfendant 
Neighbor which was fraudulent since it: stated that there were 
no pernor's Warrants; (Recor^ ; 
3. Defendant Neighbor committed tra I l>y I est it 
oath that the Utah Governor's Warrant was valid when he knew 
it win ' I Ml ! know whether or not i t was val id; 
(Record 
4. Defendant Rowe, knowing that Judge Sorensen had ordered 
• the i MI r i"nmnr * «• Warrant invalidated, 
misrepresented to tl le Judge o, .*,. September g 
ir iaintiff,s Petition i_. Habeas Corpus mat trie utah 
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Governor's Warrant was valid and further that he withheld the 
March 14, 1991, Arizona Requisition Documents and Executive 
Agreement from the Court at that hearing while defending the 
position that the Governor's Warrant was valid; (Record p. 
30) 
5. Defendant Rowe also represented to the Court that there 
was a Utah Attorney General's Opinion that opined that there 
was no time limitation on Governor's Warrants when in fact no 
such Opinion existed. (Record p. 31) 
In Count Five Plaintiff alleged that he suffered public 
humiliation and/or wrongful punishment before conviction at the 
hands of Defendant Knighton. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on January 7, 1993, in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court. (Record p. 1) On February 3, 1993, the 
Washington County Defendants filed a Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss, 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Record p. 116) Oral arguments on the 
Motion to Dismiss were heard on March 22, 1993, before Judge Eves. 
(Record p. 177) Judge Eaves issued a Memorandum Opinion on April 
20, 1993, in which he granted the Motion and dismissed all of 
Plaintiff's claims against the Washington County Defendants. 
(Record p. 185) Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider on August 
27, 1993. (Record p. 217) The Washington County Defendants filed 
an opposing Memorandum (Record p. 365), and a hearing on the Motion 
to Reconsider was held on November 22, 1993. (Record p. 376) On 
December 9, 1993, Judge Eaves issued an Order upholding his 
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previous Memorandum Opinioi1, dismissing Plaintiff's case against 
the Washington County Defendants. (Record p. 377) 
Statement 
On August 23, 1990, Plaintiff was arrested on a VJai i an! i M U M J 
by Maricopa County, Arizona. (Record p. 1I) Plaintiff was 
arraigned ' «ii | u> j i t j v* i • nn|. i ,j i nt in the Fifth Circuit Court 
and bond was set at $2A» , uOO , U(J , pending *: 
proceedings from Arizona, the demanding State, pursuant to the Utah 
Exti - * - -Vugust 28, 199C Dond was 
reduced by the Fifth Circuit Court t.
 vt 
thereafter freed on bond. (Record p. 12) 
P ,; i rested on February 15, 199] * - . same 
Warrant CJ: Maricopa County, Arizona. ( 
again incarcerated the Washington County Jail. Record 
From "ebruary 15, 1991, Arizona took ,i,i;vii 
to extradite Plaintiff che charges outsi-j. 
(Record p I \ j On February 19, 1991, Plaintiff was arraigned on a 
new in, dh F"u che Fifth Circuit Court and was 
released on hit:, own recognizance pending * ' i 
proceedings from Arizona, Record p. ; Mar en 2 0 , 1.991, 
Plaint i f t MHitjh' vvttt i« n «11 ri> i ry 'piipf pursuant *- -* VJ>-:T of Habeas 
Corpus in the? Fifth District Court, the Honor n 
presiding. (Record p, I-I ) At the conclusion of -•* - .-i--.- Judge 
Sorensen « State of Arizona * obtain 
a Governor's Warrant within 90 days of the Plaint2 t 
cans,f I the state of Utah to loose jurisdiction over the Plaintiff. 
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Judge Sorensen also ordered that any existing or pending Utah 
Governor's Warrant could not be executed against Plaintiff. 
(Record p. 14) 
On March 14, 1991, Arizona Governor Fife Symington executed 
Rendition Documents for the extradition of Plaintiff on the same 
charges. (Record p. 15) Those documents were submitted to the 
Utah Executive Department later that same month. (Record p. 15) 
On March 25, 1991, a Utah Governor's Warrant was executed by then 
Governor Bangerter for the arrest of Plaintiff. (Record p. 16) 
The March 25, 1991, Governor's Warrant was not served on Plaintiff 
because of the outstanding Order of Judge Sorensen. (Record p. 16) 
On August 13, 1991, a second Utah Governor's Warrant was 
executed by then Governor Bangerter for the arrest of Plaintiff for 
the same charges previously mentioned out of Arizona pursuant to 
the March 14, 1991, rendition documents. (Record p. 17) 
On August 19, 1991, Defendant Dorothy Poulsen, the Extradition 
Coordinator for Governor Bangerter, sent a Memorandum to Defendant 
Jon Neighbor, Washington County Undersheriff. Defendant Poulsen 
enclosed both the March Warrant and the August Warrant, along with 
a Memorandum informing Defendant Neighbor that the Governor's 
Warrant was in effect and that there was no statute of limitations 
on the Governor's Warrant. (Record p. 17) 
The Arizona Rendition Documents had all been approved as to 
legal form and validity by the Defendant Richard D. Wyss, Assistant 
Utah Attorney General. (Record p. 18) 
On August 26, 1991, Defendant Cory Pulsipher, a Washington 
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County Deputy Sheriff, arrested Plaintiff pursuant to the August 
, 1991, Utah Governor's Warrant. (Record p. 18) Plaintiff was 
thereaf be i : i i icarcerated :i i: !::l: 1 = I 7asl i :i ng toi 1 Coi u ity J a :i ] (Record p. 
18) Plaintiff petitioned the Fifth Judicial District Court for 
Writ r-* Habeas Corpus pursuant to his arrest on the August, 1991, 
1
 (Remi i | i ) September t: , 1991, :\ 
hearing was held Plaintiff's Petition in Habeas Corpus*. { Keci ,n d 
The Writ was denied because there was a recently issued 
Governor's Warrant before *-r~ ^ u r * . 
(Record p, 18) The Governor #s Warrant had been in 
time Plaintiff was re-arrested on August 26, 1991. Plaintiff's 
Complaint al ] <= .ge. = til: : z „ t :iii n : :i i ig that Court proceeding both on the 
record and off the record, Defendant 
Washington County Attorney, alluded Attorney General's 
0 tnat there n^ Statute of Limitations 
on Governor's Warrants* (Record r>_ 
On September 6 Defendar Knighton, assisted by 
D messed Plaintiff out i i hn Washington 
County Jail (Record , Plaintiff was then lakcm : 
Knighton to Arizona, (Record p. 19) Plaintiff claims that during 
the pi 'ices,1, » i * ,ii*i?; rom Utah to the proper authorities 
in Arizona via the Las Vegas International A I i pc •] t, D« =t £* .i .dai I t 
Knighton exposed him to public humiliation by allowing him to stand 
c - * I various places in the airport. 
(Record pp. 20-21) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court was correct in dismissing this action for 
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. All 
of the defendants in this appeal are governmental employees. 
The conduct of which the Plaintiff complains occurred while 
the defendants were performing duties within the scope of 
their employment, and the defendants acted without fraud or 
malice. Therefore, all of the defendants are protected from 
this suit by governmental immunity. Additionally, Defendant 
Rowe, as a deputy county attorney, is also protected by 
prosecutorial immunity. 
Plaintiff was required to file a written undertaking as a 
condition precedent to maintaining a lawsuit against the 
defendants who were charged with enforcing criminal laws. 
Plaintiff did not file an undertaking at the time he filed 
this law suit or at any time prior to filing his lawsuit. 
Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint was rightfully dismissed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT BELOW DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BECAUSE ALL OF THE WASHINGTON COUNTY 
DEFENDANTS ARE PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
Dismissal of a case under Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules £ 
Civil Procedure is proper when the court construes the complaint in 
,- indulging all reasonable 
inferences in plaintiff's favor, and still finds wit 
that plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state : 
IrH.'li - IIIJI h i in 1 1 1 I pmvMil hii support his claims. St. Benedicts 
Dev. Co. . 811 P.2d at I'M., be case c: - u hich 
Plaintiff complained of were all committed by the defendants while 
see* their employment pursuant ' , lii"'1'^  
executed Utah Governor's Warrant I'I dint i J I w.ts dt'iebU1 I I i 11. " , 
detained, and extradited pursuant to the authority of the Warrant. 
Defendants are all immune from this suit 
because of governmental immunity. 
Plaintiff's claims are based on allegations that the Utah 
he was arrested rind extradited was 
void -,t. allegation . _- crue, then the responsible | 1.1 r I >' 11. 
the Utah Governor7s Office, not the Washington County Defendants 
"-overnor's Warrant. 
Defendant Rowe Deputy Washington 
Defendant Humphries is the Washington County Sheriff. Defendants 
Neighbor, :e Washington County Deputy 
Sheriffs • Washington County Defendants are all gc > v ei 1 lmei 1 t: 
employees. Under Utah Code Annotated §63-30-4(4), n governmental 
employee cannot be held liable in his or her representative 
capacity unless the entity which employs the employee is held 
liable. Plaintiff did not name Washington County as a defendant. 
Therefore this action is against the Defendants personally, and not 
as representatives of Washington County. 
According to Utah Code Annotated §63-30-4(4): "[N]o employee 
[of a governmental entity] may be held personally liable for acts 
or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under the color of 
authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or 
failed to act due to fraud or malice." This statute precludes all 
statutory and common law actions against a governmental employee in 
his or her personal capacity, except where fraud or malice is 
established. Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah 1983). 
The Utah Supreme Court has established strict requirements for 
proving fraud. The elements of fraud are: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) Concerning a presently 
existing material fact; (3) Which was false; (4) Which the 
representor either: (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representation; (5) For the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) That the other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) 
Did in fact rely upon it; (8) And was thereby induced to act; 
(9) To his injury and damage. 
DeBry v. Salt Lake County et al. . 835 P. 2d 981, 988 (Utah App. 
1992). Malice requires more than ill will. Malice is defined as 
"a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse." 
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 485-86, 24 S.Ct. 505, 508, 48 L.Ed. 
13 
754 (1903). Plaintiff has failed to allege actions on the part of 
the Washington County Defendants to establish a case of fraud or of 
malice. Therefore, the Washington County Defendants are protected 
against Plaintiff's lawsuit by governmental immunity. Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-4(4). 
Defendant Pulsipher is the Washington County Deputy Sheriff 
who arrested and imprisoned Plaintiff while executing the August 
13 , 1991, Utah Governor's Warrant. Executing what appears to be a 
properly issued, facially valid Governor's Warrant by arresting the 
subject of that warrant and placing him in jail is clearly within 
the scope of employment of a deputy sheriff. Defendant Pulsipher 
did not act outside the directives of the Warrant, and therefore, 
did not act with any discretion. Since Defendant Pulsipher's 
actions were not discretionary, and he did not commit a wrongful 
act without just cause or excuse, he could not have acted with 
malice. Nor did Defendant Pulsipher act fraudulently. Therefore, 
Defendant Pulsipher is immune to this suit by virtue of 
governmental immunity. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-4(4). 
Defendant Knighton is the Washington County Deputy Sheriff who 
transported Plaintiff from the State of Utah to the State of 
Arizona. Plaintiff sued Defendant Knighton, alleging that 
Plaintiff was subjected to public humiliation or undue punishment 
while being transported from Utah to Arizona. Transporting 
prisoners is clearly within the duty of a Washington County Deputy 
Sheriff. In this case Defendant Knighton was directed to transport 
Plaintiff under the authority of a facially valid Utah Governor's 
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Warrant. Furthermore, Defendant Knighton transported Plaintiff 
only after a Utah Court held a hearing on Plaintiff's Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. In that hearing the Court determined that 
the Writ should be denied and Plaintiff should be extradited under 
the Governor's Warrant. 
Defendant Knighton acted within the scope of his employment 
pursuant to a duly executed Utah Governor's Warrant. Defendant 
Knighton did not act outside the directives of the Warrant. 
Because the Defendant only acted pursuant to the Warrant he did not 
act with any discretion. Since the Defendant's actions were not 
discretionary, and he did not commit a wrongful act without just 
cause or excuse, he could not have acted with malice. Also, 
neither did Defendant Knighton act fraudulently. Therefore, 
Defendant Knighton is immune to this suit by virtue of governmental 
immunity. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-4(4). 
Defendant Neighbor is a Washington County Deputy Sheriff, as 
well as the Undersheriff of Washington County, and the Jail 
Commander. Defendant Neighbor is a defendant in this lawsuit 
because Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Neighbor received a 
Memorandum from Defendant Poulsen, who was the Utah State 
Extradition Coordinator, advising him that there was no statute of 
limitations on a Governor's Warrant and that the August 13, 1991, 
Governor's Warrant was valid. Subsequently, when called to testify 
at Plaintiff's hearing on his Petition for Habeas Corpus, Defendant 
Neighbor testified that the Warrant was valid. Plaintiff alleges 
that Defendant Neighbor either knew that the Governor's Warrant was 
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not valid or did not know whether it was valid or not and that 
therefore he committed a fraud by so testifying. 
Plaintiff's Complaint alleged that Defendant Neighbor acted 
fraudulently. However, in order to commit fraud a party must make 
a knowingly or reckless false representation or omission of a 
material fact. Sucrarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson. 610 P. 2d 1369, 
1373 (Utah 1980). The alleged actions of Defendant Neighbor 
clearly do not rise to that standard. 
An executive warrant that is regular upon its face is prima 
facie evidence that all that was necessary to issue the warrant was 
completed by the Governor, and that the warrant was validly issued. 
Hyatt v. New York, 188 U.S. 691, 711, 23 S.Ct. 456, 458-59, 47 
L.Ed. 657 (1903); Emia v. Havward. 703 P.2d 1043, 1047 (Utah 1985). 
To be regular on its face, a Governor's Warrant must be signed by 
the Governor, sealed with the State Seal, address an official 
entrusted with its execution, and substantially recite the facts 
necessary to validate its issuance. Utah Code Ann. §77-30-7. The 
Governor's Warrant issued in this case satisfied all of those 
requirements. Accordingly, under Hyatt the existence of the 
Governor's Warrant was prima facie evidence that it was properly 
issued and valid. 
When Defendant Neighbor received the August 13, 1991, 
Governor's Warrant it was accompanied with a Memorandum informing 
Defendant Neighbor that the Governor's Warrant was in effect. 
Defendant Neighbor had no duty or authority to question the 
validity of this Governor's Warrant. It appeared to be properly 
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issued and facially valid. Therefore, Defendant Neighbor's 
representation that it was valid was not a knowingly or reckless 
false representation. Therefore his testimony could not have been 
fraudulent. 
When Defendant Neighbors testified that the August 13, 1991, 
Governor's Warrant appeared to be properly issued and facially 
valid he was doing so in the course of performing his duties as a 
Washington County employee. Under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-4(4), a 
governmental employee is protected by governmental immunity unless 
that employee acts with fraud or malice. Plaintiff's Complaint 
does not show fraud or malice on the part of Defendant Neighbor 
when Defendant Neighbor testified at Plaintiff's hearing. 
Therefore, Defendant Neighbor is protected by governmental immunity 
and Plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed. 
Defendant Neighbor is also a defendant in this suit because 
after Plaintiff's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied, 
Defendant Neighbor assisted in preparing Plaintiff for transport 
from Utah to Arizona by helping to chain and shackle him. 
Defendant Neighbor was acting as the Undersheriff of Washington 
County as well as the Jail Commander while performing these duties. 
Preparing inmates for transport by helping to chain and shackle 
them is clearly within the scope of Defendant Neighbor's 
employment. Plaintiff failed to allege or demonstrate in his 
pleadings that Defendant Neighbor acted due to fraud or malice. 
Plaintiff's complaint against Defendant Neighbor was properly 
dismissed under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-4(4). 
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Defendant Humphries is a defendant in this lawsuit because he 
is the Washington County Sheriff. Apparently, Plaintiff wanted to 
hold Defendant Humphries liable for the actions of his deputies. 
However, Plaintiff did not make any claims against Defendant 
Humphries. Since Plaintiff made no claims against Defendant 
Humphries, Plaintiff's complaint against Defendant Humphries was 
properly dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 
Defendant Rowe is a Deputy Washington County Attorney. He is 
a defendant in this lawsuit because Plaintiff claims that Defendant 
Rowe knew of the proceedings before Judge Sorenson following 
Plaintiff's arrest on the March, 1991, Fugitive Warrant from 
Arizona. Plaintiff alleged that at the September 5, 1991, hearing 
on Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Defendant Rowe 
withheld that information from the Court, failed to produce the 
supporting documents for the newly issued Governor's Warrant, and 
misrepresented to the Court that there was an Attorney General's 
Opinion which indicated that there was no statute of limitations on 
Governor's Warrants. The Complaint made no allegations that this 
conduct was malicious. Plaintiff did complain that the withholding 
of the information and the misrepresentation as to the existence of 
an Attorney General's position constituted a fraud. 
Plaintiff failed to allege facts that could have constituted 
fraud by Defendant Rowe. In order to establish fraud, a party must 
prove that a representation was made by one party and that another 
party did in fact rely upon the representation, and was thereby 
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induced to act to his injury and damage. Debry, 835 P.2d at 988. 
Plaintiff did not allege in his Complaint that the Court relied in 
any way on Defendant Rowe's representation. Nor did Plaintiff's 
Complaint allege that the Court's determination to deny his 
Petition for Habeas Corpus and to order him extradited to Arizona 
was in any was effected by Defendant Rowe's representation as to 
the existence of an Attorney General's Opinion. In fact, Plaintiff 
alleges that the Court denied his Writ Primarily because it had 
before it a facially valid and apparently properly issued 
Governor's Warrant dated only a few days prior to Plaintiff's 
arrest. (Record p. 18) In order to prevail on a cause of action 
for fraud, Plaintiff must prove not only that there was a knowing 
misrepresentation of a material fact, but that it was relied upon 
to his detriment. No such reliance has been alleged and none can 
be demonstrated. 
Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that at his September 5, 
1991, hearing, Defendant Rowe committed fraud by representing to 
the Court that a statute of limitation did not exist for Governor's 
Warrants. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant Rowe committed 
fraud by failing to present the March 14, 1991, Arizona rendition 
documents to the Court, which he contends were previously 
invalidated. However, such acts, if committed, were not fraudulent 
because they were not knowing or reckless representations or 
omissions of material facts. 
The Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to the August 13, 1991 
Utah Governor's Warrant. The Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of 
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Habeas Corpus was subsequently denied at his September 5, 1991, 
hearing and he was extradited because of the presumptively valid 
August 13, 1991, Utah Governor's Warrant. Thus, the March 14, 
1991, Arizona rendition documents were not material to the 
Plaintiff's September 5, 1991, hearing. Accordingly, even if the 
Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant Rowe failed to present the 
March 14, 1991 Arizona rendition documents is true, that is not a 
false representation of material facts. Moreover, the August 13, 
1991, Utah Governor's Warrant represented prima facie evidence that 
it was validly issued. Therefore, Defendant Rowe was entitled to 
rely upon it for authority, and it was the Plaintiff's burden to 
present any documents to establish that the warrant was not validly 
issued. Hvatt. 188 U.S. at 711, 23 S.Ct at 458-59; Emicr. 703 P.2d 
at 1047. 
The same reasoning applies to the Plaintiff's allegation that 
Defendant Rowe acted fraudulently by representing to the Court that 
a statute of limitations did not exist for Governor's Warrants. 
Because the Plaintiff's August 26, 1991, arrest was on the August 
13, 1991, Utah Governor's Warrant, the limitations period 
applicable to Governor's Warrants was not at issue. Therefore, 
assuming Plaintiff's allegation is true, Defendant Rowe's 
representation would not amount to a material fact and would not be 
fraudulent. Therefore, Defendant Rowe was protected by 
governmental immunity under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-4, and 
Plaintiff's Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Rowe was 
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properly dismissed. 
Even if Defendant Rowe was not protected by the Governmental 
immunity, Plaintiff's Complaint failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted because Defendant Rowe was protected by 
prosecutorial immunity. It is well established law that a 
prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for acts committed while 
engaged in an advocatory function. Imbler v. Pachtman, 4 24 U.S. 
409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (976); McDonald v. Lakewood 
Country Club, 461 P.2d 437 (Colo. 1969); State ex rel. Dept. of 
Justice v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. In and For 
Cascade County. 560 P.2d 1328 (Mont. 1976); Powell v. Seay, 560 
P.2d 555 (Okl. 1976); Creelman v. Svenninq, 410 P.2d 606 (Wash. 
1966); Mul 1 iaan v. Grace. 666 P.2d 1092 (Ariz.App. 1983). The 
absolute immunity of a prosecutor is so broad that it is maintained 
even in civil rights cases where the prosecutor is alleged to have 
used misleading or false evidence. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 
1446 (8th Cir. 1987). 
The claims made against Defendant Rowe, a Deputy Washington 
County Attorney, concern his participation in the charging and 
extradition of the Plaintiff. Such an activity is clearly within 
the advocatory function of a prosecutor. Therefore, regardless of 
the claims that the Plaintiff has made against Defendant Rowe he is 
absolutely immune from suit. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to 
state a claim against Defendant Rowe upon which relief may be 
granted. 
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II. THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO POST A BOND# A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO 
PILING THIS ACTION. 
Before an> action may be filed against any peace officer or 
any other person charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal 
laws of the State of Utah for an act committed in the performance 
of that officer's or person's duty, as a condition precedent to 
maintaining that action, the potential plaintiff must file a 
written undertaking with at least two sureties. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-11-10. 
The Washington County Defendants are law enforcement officers 
and or persons charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws 
of the State of Utah. This action is based on acts which were 
committed by the Washington County Defendants while performing 
official duties. 
Piling a written undertaking is a condition precedent to 
maintaining an action against a law enforcement official. The law 
requires the written undertaking "[b]efore any action may be filed 
. . . ." Id. Plaintiff failed to file a written undertaking at the 
time he filed his Complaint. Therefore his Complaint was 
rightfully dismissed. See Rippstein v. City of Provo. 929 F.2d 
576 (loth Cir. 1991) (Plaintiffs failure to file an undertaking at 
the time the complaint was filed warranted dismissal of the 
action.) 
CONCLUSION 
The Washington County Defendants are immune to this suit 
because of governmental immunity and prosecutorial immunity. The 
acts which Plaintiff complained of were committed by the defendants 
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while in performance of their official duties. Plaintiff's 
complaint failed to adequately allege fraud or malice on the part 
of the defendants. Furthermore, as governmental employees charged 
with upholding the criminal laws of Utah, the defendants are 
protected from this suit because Plaintiff failed to file an 
undertaking before filing this suit. Therefore, the trial court 
was correct in ordering this case dismissed against the Washington 
County Defendants. 
Wherefore, the Washington County Defendants pray for the 
following relief: 
1. Uphold the order of the trial court. 
2. Award costs and attorney fees to the Defendants. 
Dated this f ^ ^ d a y of September, 1994. 
Lynn (J. Li 
LYNN J. LUti0 & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendants Rowe, 
Humphries, Neighbor, Pulsipher 
& Knighton 
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